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Introduction
Following the new wave of regionalisation in the eighties, regional integration has again been extensively investigated both in the theoretical and empirical literature. Recent analyses are based on Viner's (1950) There exists already an extensive literature analysing the effects of regional free trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows and stressing the role of regionalisation. However, the evidence is mixed. Most studies assume that the FTA formation (i.e. the choice of partner countries) is exogenous, but some papers highlight the potential endogeneity bias in estimating the effects of FTAs on trade volumes (Magee, 2003; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) . Regional agreements require the assent of two governments. According to Grossman and Helpman (1995) a FTA assumes a relative balance in the potential trade between the partner countries.
In this paper we focus on association agreements between four Central and Eastern
European countries (CEEC-4, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and 3 European Union member states (EU-15, i.e. Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) in the context of EU enlargement towards the East, taking into account the conditions under which countries agree on FTAs, and their effects on trade. Our econometric analysis is based on the gravity model and tries to determine the effects of association agreements on trade flows treating FTAs as endogenous. We are particularly interested in whether such European agreements have increased trade flows between their members and, if so, by how much. To address these issues, we examine the bilateral trade volume introducing a dummy variable which represents the association agreement. In addition, we investigate the robustness of the association agreement variable in two different ways by considering an extended sample of countries including three countries (Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine) that did not sign an FTA with EU-15 and using different estimations methods. Also, we compare the trade growth between the EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries and the trade growth between the EU-15 and other countries which did not have a trade agreement. Further, we use panel data techniques to isolate and eliminate the potential endogeneity bias of the agreement variable The contribution of this paper is threefold: i) in contrast to previous studies we rely on a estimation method, i.e. the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD), that enables us to isolate and eliminate the potential endogeneity bias of the agreement variable, thereby obtaining more robust results. The agreement variable is here treated as endogenous, unlike in earlier studies. ii) The sample period has been extended and includes additional observations, spanning the period 1987-2005. iii) We check the robustness of the effects of FTAs by also considering a group of control countries (Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) which did not conclude an agreement with EU; besides, we examine whether bilateral trade between the CEEC-4 and EU-15 is higher than between the EU-15 and this group of control countries.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss briefly European agreements and the issue of endogeneity in regional agreements. In Section 3 we outline the theoretical framework, i.e. the gravity model. In sections 4 we discuss alternative econometric methods to estimate gravity models, whilst the empirical analysis 4 is presented in Section 5. Section 6 summarises the main findings and offers some concluding remarks.
European Agreements and the Endogeneity Issue
EU enlargement is not a new phenomenon, as the EU has already been enlarged several times since its creation: the year 1973 marked the accession of Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland; 1981, of Greece; 1986, of Spain and Portugal; 1995, of Austria, Sweden and Finland. However, EU enlargement towards the East is different both politically and economically, as it is the first time that countries belonging to the old communist bloc have applied for EU membership, and on this occasion integration has increased by as much as a third the EU population and territory (and to a lesser extent its wealth).
The EU proposed two basic strategic objectives for enlargement. Firstly, the creation of a Europe which guarantees peace, stability, democracy and respect of the human rights of minorities. Secondly, the creation of an open and competitive market able to improve the standard of living in the CEEC, gradually achieving real convergence. As a first step, in the early nineties all candidate countries signed bilateral "European Agreements" or "Association Agreements" with the EU creating preferential trade relationships. 5 These included a time schedule for trade liberalisation between the signatories, with the EU agreeing to reduce barriers more quickly than the CEEC. However, initially tariff and non-tariff barriers were not dismantled for sensitive sectors such as agriculture and textiles.
The expansion of regionalism has spawned an extensive literature on the effects of FTAs on trade flows and the choice of countries to form a preferential trade agreement. This literature focuses on welfare-enhancing and political arguments to explain association agreements. Since Viner (1950) most studies have analysed the welfare gains or losses 5 from FTAs for member countries. FTAs have a positive impact on welfare if trade creation exceeds trade diversion. Factors accounting for the probability that two countries sign a regional agreement can be divided in three groups: (i) geography factors, (ii) intraindustry trade determinants, (iii) inter-industry trade determinants 6 . In brief, two countries are more likely to sign an agreement if they are closer geographically, similar in size and differ in terms of factor endowment ratios:
i) The net welfare gain is higher the closer the two countries are, because of trade creation. Several studies (see Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1996; Frankel and Wei, 1998) include geographical proximity in their analysis of a FTA formation. The rationale is the existence of transport costs (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) , leading to the concept of "natural trade partners" based on geographical distance 7 . Krugman (1991b) shows that in the case of agreements between geographically close countries trade creation is sizable (see also Wonnacott and Lutz, 1989 ), but the concept of "natural" partners has attracted criticism, on the grounds that geographical proximity and initially high trade volumes do not necessarily ensure trade creation after FTA formation (see Bhagwati and Panagaryia, 1996) .
(ii) The larger and more similar in economic size the two countries signing a trade agreement are, the higher the welfare gains from trade creation, which are achieved by exploiting economies of scale in the presence of differentiated products.
(iii) The greater the difference in endowment ratios between two countries, the higher the potential welfare gains from trade creation reflecting traditional comparative advantages.
Consequently, countries which sign a regional agreement tend to have similar economic characteristics, which leads to trade creation and welfare gains.
Non-economic objectives can also be behind regional agreements (Johnson 1965b, Cooper and Massell (1965) , Wonnacott and Lutz, 1989 , Magee, 2003 , Baier and 6 Bergstrand, 2004 . In particular, better political decision-making, a guarantee of policy irreversibility, and bigger negotiating power with third parties could also explain such agreements (especially when the agreement takes the form of a customs union with a common exterior tariff -see Schiff and Winters, 1998) . Also, democratic countries are more interested in consumers' welfare and more likely to sign agreements with other democratic partners. Further, De Melo et al. (1993) showed that regional agreements make the implementation of policies more effective owing to a dilution effect of preferences: the lobby capacity of interest groups is lower in a regional as opposed ot national framework. Finally, such agreements make domestic policy reforms irreversible (Fernandez et Portes, 1998).
There exists already an extensive literature analysing the effects of regional free trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows and stressing the role of regionalization. Rose (2004) in his paper estimates the effect of multilateral trade agreements: the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) on international trade. He uses a standard gravity model of bilateral trade and a large panel data set. His findings reveal that there is little evidence that GATT/WTO membership has a substantial positive effect on trade. The GSP and the regional trade associations typically seem to have a much larger effect than the multilateral GATT/WTO system indicating that trade at least doubles with membership.
The first empirical studies analysing the trade effects of a FTA included a FTA dummy variable in a gravity model. Most of them treated FTA formation (choice of partner countries) as exogenous. The evidence was mixed. For instance, some studies found a significant impact of EC (European Community) agreements on trade flows between members (Aitken, 1973) , whilst others concluded that this effect was insignificant (Bergstrand, 1985) or even negative (Frankel, 1997) . This highlighted the potential endogeneity bias affecting the preferential agreement variable, and subsequently a few studies tried to address the endogeneity issue by considering the role of economic factors, democratic freedom, and transport costs in the decision to conclude a regional agreement. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found that pairs of countries that sign an agreement tend to share common economic characteristics, which results in net trade creation and welfare growth. Magee (2003) measured the effects of preferential agreements on trade volumes treating FTAs as endogenous, estimating a system of simultaneous equations with 2SLS.
He found that it is likely that two countries will sign an agreement if they are closer geographically, are similar in size and are both democracies. Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) tried to test the robustness of the regional agreement effect by using cross-section data. They concluded that its effect may be over-or underestimated owing to the potential endogeneity of this variable. These findings were confirmed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) , who pointed out that the regional agreement variable is not exogenous and the estimation of a gravity model using cross-section data for investigating the quantitative effect of this variable on trade flows can be biased because of unobservable heterogeneity or/and omitted variables. The bias resulting from not considering this variable as endogenous is an important issue; it can be the consequence of omitted variables that can be correlated with the regional agreement variable. Panel data (fixed effects) methods were shown to be suitable to take endogeneity into account.
Given the theoretical and empirical literature presented above concerning the FTA formation, we now focus on the specific conditions which determined the association of the CEEC-4 with the EU-15. The European Union enlargement to include the CEEC countries was one of the Nice Summit challenges. This enlargement has contributed to overcoming the artificial division of Europe, and has finally given the CEEC countries, which have always been part of Europe, a chance to participate in the European project.
The collapse of the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) put an end to trade on the basis of planned exchanges, and to major industrial projects and/or cooperation contracts based on production complementarity without considering demand and supply. It has led to major transformations with the introduction of a market economy, reintegration of the CEEC into the European economy, and changes in the geography of the European Union. On their part, the Western European countries have turned more towards the CEEC countries, a dynamic and accessible market. Both trade reorientation and EU enlargement have led to the signing of association agreements, the 8 first step towards integration. In fact, the ultimate goal of the agreements is the accession of these countries. Despite the similar framework and structure of the agreements, allowance has been made for differences across countries, especially in terms of free trade, financial cooperation and sectoral policies.
In conclusion, in the context of the EU enlargement, the economic and political transition of the CEECs to a market economy and towards a democratic system and the geographical proximity to the EU-15 core represent important factors that determine the signing of association agreements. Even if the literature indicates the importance of economic size in the FTA formation, in this case we can see the existence of differences in factor endowment between the EU and the CEEC which can generate trade flows based on comparative advantage, and therefore increase the wealth. As international trade is one of the factors driving economic growth, we are interested in examining the effects on trade of FTAs between the CEEC-4 and the EU-15.
Trade Flow Effects of FTAs: The Gravity Model
Our theoretical framework to examine the trade flows effects of FTAs (treating association agreements as endogenous) is the gravity model 8 , in which trade flows from country i to country j are a function of the supply of the exporter country and of the demand of the importer country and trade barriers. In other words, national incomes of two countries, transport costs (transaction costs) and regional agreements are the basic determinants of trade.
Initially inspired by Newton's gravity law, gravity models have become essential tools in the analysis of the effects of regional agreements on trade flows. The first applications were rather intuitive, without great theoretical claims. These included the contributions of Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) . But these studies were criticised for their lack of robust theoretical foundations. Subsequently, new international trade theory provided theoretical justifications for these models in terms of increasing returns of scale, imperfect competition and geography (transport costs). Linnemann (1966) proposed a gravity model derived from a Walrasian, general equilibrium model. He explained exports of country i to country j in terms of the interaction of three factors: potential supply of exports of country i, potential demand of imports from the country j and a factor representing trade barriers. Potential export supply is a positive function of the exporting country's income level and can also be interpreted as a proxy for product variety. Potential import demand is a positive function of the importing country's income level. Barriers to trade are a negative function of trade costs, transport costs, tariffs. The model takes the following form:
where Y represents country income, N represents the population, D is the geographical distance and P k includes dummy variables. Anderson (1979) , Bergstrand (1985) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) provided further theoretical justifications for this model. This equation was extended by Bergstrand (1989) by including per capita income, which is an indicator of demand sophistication (demand for luxury versus necessity goods): where X ij represents exports of country i to country j, β 0 is the intercept, Y i and Y j are the GDP of country i and j respectively, (Y i /N i ) and (Y j /N j ) stand for GDP per capita of country i and j respectively, D ij represents the geographical distance between the economic centers of two partners, P kij stands for other variables such as common language and historical bonds.
Econometric Issues
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The regionalism issue was most frequently examined using a gravity model including a dummy variable for regional agreements 9 . Most studies estimating a gravity model applied the ordinary least square (OLS) method to cross-section data. Recently several papers have argued that standard cross-section methods lead to biased results because they do not account for heterogeneity. For instance, the impact of historical, cultural and linguistic links on trade flows is difficult to quantify. On the other hand, the potential sources of endogeneity bias in gravity model estimations fall under three categories: omitted variables, simultaneity, and measurement error (see Wooldridge, 2002) . Matyas (1997) points out that the cross-section approach is affected by misspecification and suggests that the gravity model should be specified as a "three -way model" with exporter, importer and time effects (random or fixed ones). Egger (2000) Next we provide more details of the alternative methods mentioned above, i.e. random effect estimator (REM), fixed effect estimator (FEM) and fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD).
Within Estimator and Random Estimator (FEM and REM)
In the presence of correlation of the unobserved characteristics with some of the explanatory variables the random effect estimator leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters. To eliminate this correlation it is possible to use a traditional method called "within estimator or fixed effect estimator" which consists in transforming the data into deviations from individual means. In this case, even if there is correlation between unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables, the within estimator provides unbiased and consistent results.
The fixed effect model can be written as where α i denotes individual effects fixed over time and u it is the disturbance term.
If we substract from (2) the average over time of (2) we obtain the fixed effects transformation as:
In the fixed effect transformation, the unobserved effect, α i , disappears, which yields unbiased and consistent results.
The random model has the same form as before,
where an intercept is included so that the unobserved effect, á i , has a zero mean. Equation (4) becomes a random effect model when we assume that the unobserved effect á i is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable:
Cov(x itk , á i ) = 0, t = 1,2,…, T; j =1,2,…, k.
The Hausman χ 2 test consists in testing the null hypothesis of no correlation between unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables and allows us to make a choice between random estimator and within estimator. The within estimator has however two important limits:
-it may not estimate the time-invariant variables that are eliminated by data transformation;
-the fixed effect estimator ignores variations across individuals. The individual's specificities can be correlated or not with the explanatory variable. In traditional methods these correlated variables are replaced with instrumental variables uncorrelated to unobservable characteristics.
Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD)
Plümper and Troeger (2004) The FEVD approach is implemented as follows.
First step
Recall the data generating process of equation (8) . The within estimator quasi de-means the data and removes the individual effects u i :
The variance not used by the fixed effect estimator is most important.
The unit effects are explained by: 
Second step
Given equation (11), it is simple to regress the i û on the z-variables. (12) where ω is the intercept of the stage 2 equation and η i is the unexplained part of the unit effects as in equation (11) . Equations (11) and (12) 
Empirical Analysis
The Econometric Strategy
The econometric model we adopt in order to identify and to quantify the impact of the association agreement on trade flows between the EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries was chosen taking into account our sample of data, the potential endogeneity of the variables, the existence of unobservable bilateral characteristics which might or might not be correlated with the explanatory variables, and multicollinearity.
Our econometric specification is the following:
In this specification, the average value of bilateral trade (Y ijt ) is the dependent variable.
The explanatory variables used are the gross domestic product of the two partners (GDP it ), (GDP jt ), geographic distance (Dist ij ), income per capita (GDPC it, GDPC jt ), political stability (Stp), landlocked countries (Llk) and the dichotomous variable association agreement (Acc ijt ).
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The notation is the following:
• Y ijt denotes the average value of bilateral trade between countries i and j at time t with i ≠ j (millions of dollars); • α o is the intercept;
• GDP it , GDP jt represent the Gross Domestic Product of country i and country j (millions of dollars); • GDP it /N it , GDP jt /N jt are the GDP per capita of country i and country j • Dist ij represents the distance between country i and country j (kilometers);
• Acc ijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if country i and country j have concluded a regional agreement at time t, and zero otherwise;
• Stp ijt is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if country has political stability and zero otherwise;
• Llk ij is a dummy variable representing the number of landlocked countries in the country -pair (0, 1 or 2). • u ij is a bilateral specific effect (i = 1,2,…,N, j = 1,2,…,M) ;
• θ t is a time specific effect (t = 1,…..T);
• ε ijt is the disturbance term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and a constant variance for all observations and to be uncorrelated.
To assess the robustness of our results on the effects of FTAs we include in our sample a control group of countries, specifically Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, i.e. three countries, which belonged in the past to the Communist bloc and have then introduced market reforms but did not sign a FTA with the EU. More precisely, we test whether the association dummy is still significant if one considers the period where all CEEC-4 have an Acc ijt dummy of 1 and where additional countries that did not sign an FTA are added to the estimation sample with an Acc ijt dummy of 0. The Acc ijt dummy variable measures the impact of the association agreement on trade between members. The estimated equation is the same as (14) with the Acc ijt dummy now defined as explained above.
Another possible way of checking robustness is to make a comparison between growth in trade between the EU and the countries that signed a FTA (i.e., the CEEC-4) and some others that did not (here Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine). For this purpose, we introduce in equation (14) two dummy variables 12 (15) where:
• Accn ijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if one country has a regional agreement and its partner-country does not at time t, and zero otherwise;
The first dummy variable measures the impact of the agreement on trade between FTA' members and the second one measures the trade effect between a member country and another which is not.
The data source is the CHELEM -French CEPII data base for GDP and population; the CEPII data base for geographic distance and Freedom House for political stability. The estimation period goes from 1987 to 2005, i.e. 19 years for a sample of EU-15 13 and 4 CEEC countries 14 for the first set of estimates. For the second we have a sample from 1991 to 2005 owing to fewer observations being available for the Russian Federation and Ukraine. We construct a panel with two dimensions: country pairs, and years.
Estimation Results
19
This section summarises the results from the estimation of the gravity model. We used panel data techniques for eliminating the endogeneity bias, and applied different panel data econometric methods such as Fixed Effect Model (FEM), Random Effect Model (REM) and Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) in order to check the robustness of our estimation technique and also of our results (see Table 1 , 2). Table 1 shows the impact of FTAs on bilateral trade between EU15 and CEEC4. The Table 1 ), which indicates that the agreement results in a 23% increase 16 in trade between the members. Thus, there is clear evidence that the agreement has increased trade volume between the EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries.
We assessed the robustness of our results using data for a larger group of countries (also including Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) (see column 3, Table 2 ). Since the FEVD method produces more robust estimates in what follows we focus on the FEDV estimates. All variables are still significant and have the expected sign, including the FTA variable. We note that in all cases the FTA variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on bilateral trade. This result is robust to the use of different estimation techniques or different samples of countries.
We also made a comparison between trade between the EU and the countries that signed a FTA (i.e., the CEEC-4) and some others that did not, and estimated for this purpose equation (15) that includes two dummy variables. Our econometric results (see Table 3 ) 20 indicate that both dummies are significant at the 1% level, which suggests that members countries are more inclined to trade amongst themselves than with other countries which are not part of the association agreement. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the Acc ijt and Accn ijt dummy variables are respectively 0.210 and 0.089, which highlights that countries which have signed an association agreement trade 14.0 % 17 more than those without such an agreement. (see Table 3 ).
As for robustness to using alternative estimation techniques, one can see that the estimated coefficients are similar for FEM and FEVD; however, the latter not only enables us to isolate the endogeneity of the association agreement variable and to obtain unbiased coefficients, but also captures the effects of time-invariant variables on trade flows.
The Fisher test suggests the introduction of effects (fixed or random) to improve the estimation results. The estimated coefficients of the FEM are different from those obtained with the REM (for instance, association agreement) which can be explained by the existence of a correlation between some explanatory variables and the bilateral specific effect. Moreover, the Hausman test rejects the null assumption of no correlation between the individual effects and some explanatory variables for all estimations. This implies endogeneity bias, and therefore the fixed effects model is preferred. The Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity (F=160.26, P-value = 0.00), confirm the endogeneity of the FTA. We also calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) to ensure that multicollinearity does not affect the quality of estimates. In our all estimates, VIF did not exceed the threshold of 10, indicating that there is no multicollinearity 18 .
Overall, the agreement variable coefficient indicates a positive and statistically significant impact on bilateral trade in all cases. .
Conclusions
This paper has analysed the impact of association agreements on trade flows between the EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries treating the agreement variable as endogenous and using appropriate panel methods to estimate a gravity equation. The most relevant estimates are those provided by the FEVD estimation method which is the most appropriate for our purposes. This method permits to obtain unbiased coefficients and to capture the effects of time-invariant variables. As theory suggests, association agreements were found to have a positive and significant impact on trade flows between the participant countries.
To check the robustness of the effects on trade of FTAs we have also included in our sample a control group of countries (Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine), i.e. three countries, which belonged in the past to the Communist bloc and have then introduced market reforms but did not sign a FTA with the EU. It must be emphasised that in all our estimations (conditional to other variables) the FTA variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on bilateral trade regardless of the estimation technique or sample of countries chosen, which provide evidence of the robustness of our results.
A comparison of trade between the EU-15 and the countries that signed a FTA (i.e., the CEEC-4) and some others that did not, specifically Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine, using two dummy variables, suggest that countries with an association agreement trade 14.0% more than the others, which do not have one. This result is consistent with theory and the experience of these countries. Indeed, in the case of the CEEC-4, following the Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% N.B. As explained in the main text, the FEVD method is the preferred one, the others (FEM and REM) are reported for comparison purposes and to check the robustness of the results to the estimation technique used. (0.00) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% N.B. As explained in the main text, the FEVD method is the preferred one, the others (FEM and REM) are reported for comparison purposes and to check the robustness of the results to the estimation technique used. Table 3 -The impact of the association agreement on bilateral trade using an extended sample of countries including the CEEC-4 and additional countries which did not conclude a FTA and estimating two dummies.
FEVD Variables
